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PREFACE
This thesis is designed to present an outline of
personnel administration as it applies to the United States
Navy. It is divided into four sections:
X§ The field of personnel administration, in which
the subject is defined and some comparisons are
made between the Navy and large business organ-
izations •
2. The background of personnel administration, which
discusses the historical aspect of the Navy per-
sonnel policies,
3. The personnel program of the Navy, covering
briefly the rise of current polioies and a
description of the present program,
4. The Navy f s personnel problems, dealing with some
of the situations peculiar to the naval insti-
tution at the present time.
In order to touch briefly on most of the aspects of
this extensive field, the material has been presented in
broad overview form. The manner in which the various sub-
jects have been covered is designed to give the reader a
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research on specific topics. Some solutions to problems are
offered, but for the most part this study has satisfied itself
with pointing out the situation which exists.
There has been little writing done on the overall
field of Navy personnel administration. To the writer's
knowledge, no single previous work has attempted to present
the material covered in this thesis. By covering the entire
subject in one paper it is hoped to bring to the attention
of officers, candidate officers, petty officers and other
interested individuals, the background for the Navy's per-
sonnel program, and to cover the current policies in such
a manner that a better understanding will result. In this
way, a start can be made toward the complete use of existing




THE FIELD OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
Introduction
In the past thirty years there has grown an increas-
ing emphasis on the art of directing people and of getting
the most effective work from them. As the techniques for
accomplishing this purpose have been studied, it has been
recognized more and more that an organization must place
men in jobs for which they are fitted, train them in their
duties, and inspire them to apply their abilities with wil-
lingness and cooperation. All this is necessary if the or-
ganization is to function at maximum efficiency. The indi-
viduals responsible for the administration of personnel
must have a sound background of psychological knowledge in
order to carry out this program.
The need for cooperation, interest, and good will
on the part of the members of an organization are being evalu-
ated at a higher worth today than ever before. In order to
gain these attitudes, it is necessary to have men correctly
placed in work for which they are capable and trained. Busi-
ness organizations have stressed the development of these
qualities to the point that a new science has grown up—the
3
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science of personnel management and administration.
From a practical, businessman's point of view, it
has been observed that the organizations practicing a hu-
mane, modern, progressive policy of personnel relations have
been conspicuously successful in competition with organi-
zations more backward in their personnel programs. It has
become widely accepted that managers in business must possess
themselves of a point of view, purposes, and methods which
secure cooperation and productivity.
In some respects the United States Navy has been
reluctant to adopt the philosophy and teachings of this new
science. We have not been without our prophets; one authority
wrote in 1920:
The personal side is a matter of training and
morale. The material part is of no value unless it
is operated by skill and by the will to win. Slack-
ness or inexperience or lack of heart in officers or
men—any of these may bring ruin. Napoleon once
spoke of the Russian army as brave, but as "an army
without a soul." A navy must have a soul. Unfortu-
nately, the tendency in recent years has been to em-
phasize the material and the mechanical at the expense
of the intellectual and spiritual. With all the enor-
mous development of the ships and weapons, it must be
remembered that the man is, and always will be, greater
than the machine .1
This logic was brought home forcefully in World War
II when we became aware of our shortcomings and embarked
upon a program designed to bring the Navy f s personnel ad-
ministration up to date. Unfortunately, the personnel man-
William Oliver Stevens and Allan Westcott. A History
of Sea Power (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1920), p. 445.
•
5agers—the officers and petty officers of the Navy, who are
responsible for the success or failure of any policy—have
not kept apace with the progress made by the Bureau of Naval
Personnel in this field. Many officers who pride themselves
on being able to understand the most complicated new elec-
tronic device, cannot interpret the test scores entered in
a recruit f s service record, pages 4A and kB; Indeed, many
do not even know that such an indication of the individuals
abilities exists.
Before elaborating further on the field of personnel
administration, it will be well to avail ourselves of a defi«
nition. Tead and Metcalf define personnel administration
as follows:
Personnel administration is the planning, super-
vision, direction, and coordination of those activities
of an organization which contribute to realizing the
defined purposes of that organization with a minimum
of human effort and friction, with an animating spirit
of cooperation, and with proper regard for the^genulne
well-being of all members of the organization.
It can be seen from this definition that these activ-
ities must permeate all phases of an organization. While we
may have individuals designated as "personnel, n "welfare,"
or "morale" officers, the responsibility for carrying out
the basic policies of good personnel administration falls
on all those in a position of responsibility. "The real
personnel managers are the lesser executives—the foremen
and the supervisors, who carry out the personnel policies
20rdway Tead and Henry C. Metcalf, Personnel
Administration (New York: McGraw Hill, 1933), p. 2.
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6decided upon by top management. 1^ This statement, made of
business organizations, is equally true of the Navy where
every officer and petty officer is a personnel manager.
Mission of Personnel Administration
Defining Purposes
We have stated in our definition that personnel work
must contribute to realizing the defined purposes of an or-
ganization. It is basic in this statement that all the mem-
bers of the organization must recognize these purposes in
order to cooperate in realizing them. No other type of or-
ganization can define its objectives more clearly than can
the United States Navy, nor can any purposes of existence
be more readily understood.
Business organizations often find difficulty in ar-
riving at a satisfactory set of objectives, other than the
profit motive inherent in our economic system, and resort to
unconvincing statements of altruistic ideals which serve
only to antagonize their members. We of the Navy are grouped
together in a common cause which serves the major purpose of
defending our country. We possess an objective towards which
we can expect the fullest support from our members. The rec-
ognition of this objective gives the members of the naval
^Rex F. Harlow and Marvin M. Black, Practical Public
Relations (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 77.
M
service an ideal which should be used as a motivating faotor.
The members 1 personal differences with short run policies or
personalities can often be smoothed over by keeping before
them the greater objectives of the service.
Well Being of Members
The part of our definition which contains the es-
sense of a smoothly functioning personnel program is "proper
regard for the genuine well-being of all members of the or-
ganization," This Implies a basic knowledge of what is es-
sential to the well-being of the individual, and this knowl-
edge of psychological, physical, social, and moral needs is
necessary for all those handling personnel. Business organ-
izations have found that regard for the members must be sin-
cere, and it must not be paternalistic to the extent of dic-
tating to personnel.
In this phase, a good personnel program must allow
free growth and mobility of the individual in the fields of
self-choice, self-discipline, and mental expansion. Time
and again business leaders such as Henry Ford have discovered
to their disappointment that a planned life, however well
conoeived, is not to the liking of the employees. Workmen
wish to make their own decisions on personal matters, whether
they be right or wrong, and the greater appearance of freedom
of choice that can be given personnel the more willing will

be their cooperation* Business studies in this field appear




A vital part of a successful program of personnel
administration is the maintenance of favorable relations
with the community. In the case of the United States Navy t
our community is the entire world. Although publio relations
counsels are not In complete agreement on all phases of their
work, they all recognize the fact that one of the most effec-
tive agents In creating a good impression on the public is
good morale on the part of the organization's members, A
large number of opinions formed by the public are gained
from contact with the personnel of the Navy, We are far
more willing to believe the word of an actual member of an
organization with regard to that organization's practices,
than we are to accept a smoothly written news report on
those practices.
In these days of a large Navy, it is the exceptional
Individual who does not know one or more members of the naval
service. Our public relations program begins in building a
sympathetic and cooperative sentiment within our own organi-
zation, so that our wword-of-mouth" relations are favorable.




9are carried on continually by the specialists in that field,
but their effect is never as significant as the good will of
naval personnel. This is one of many reasons that an im»
portant part of personnel administration is the building up
of morale in the naval organization.
Placement of Individuals
We have stated in our definition that work must be
accomplished with "a minimum of human effort and friction. n
Obviously this implies placing the individual in a job for
which he is mentally, psychologically, and physically fitted.
Personnel administration must go farther than merely elimi-
nating the obvious nsquare peg in a round hole." The more
adequately we can determine Individual abilities, the less
effort and friction will be encountered when these indi-
viduals are assigned their duties. On this premise is based
the Navy's extensive classification and distribution program.
Educational Requirements in
Personnel Administration
Finally, personnel work is seen largely as educational
work—both for the rank and file and for those officers and
petty officers who are the personnel managers. This must be
accomplished both by Navy training schools and by efficient
on-the-job training. The Navy must strive to keep abreast




sible occasions, for only by use of a vigorous and dynamic
system of education oan we cope with the rapidly changing
nature of modern warfare.
Summary and Conclusions
1. The need for specialized knowledge in personnel
administration has been demonstrated clearly in the past
thirty years, and virtually all large organizations have
utilized studies in this field. The Navy has recognized
the advantages of a sound personnel program, and is taking
advantage of the accumulated learnings of this new science.
U 2. Personnel work cannot be thought of as a function
of any individual or group of individuals, but rather as a
continual process which is carried on by all those in a po-
sition of responsibility. In the Navy, this means that all
officers and petty officers are personnel managers.
3. The Navy's personnel program has not produced
the maximum possible benefits due to a lack of knowledge
and appreciation on the part of responsible individuals in
the lower echelons.
4. A sound personnel policy must have the effect
of encouraging cooperation and effort on the part of the
organization's members. This must be accomplished by giv-
ing them the feeling of "belonging" in the organization,




5» Adherence to programs designed to benefit or
raise the social status of personnel must be more than aca-
demic, and should be evidenced by positive action prompted
by a genuine Interest in the welfare of the personnel.
6. The esprit de corps of Navy personnel is the
most effective instrument for producing favorable public
relations with the outside community.
7. Techniques for the administration of personnel
must keep pace with the growth and technical advances of
the Navy as a whole,
8. The proper placement of the individual is es-
sential to the smooth functioning of an organization. The
Navy has developed an extensive program of classification
and distribution to accomplish this purpose.
9. Education of Navy personnel is a vital part of
personnel administration. This education must be carried




THE BACKGROUND OF NAVY PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
Introduction
The sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries
were periods of little change in ships and the men who sailed
them. A British sailor fighting the Spanish Armada in 1588
would have been perfectly at home on a warship fighting the
Americans in 1812, and he would have noticed little differ-
ence between the ships of the two periods as he scrambled
aloft to reef a tops' 1. However, the progress of the next
fifty years would have left the same sailor utterly confused
aboard the smoke belching MONITOR or MERRIMAC as these fa-
mous steam-propelled ironclads fought the battle at Hampton
Roads that changed the methods of sea warfare.
The change in ships and techniques of naval warfare
since the Civil War need little description; in our time we
have seen a revolution in ways of combat, with no indication
that the pace of change will abate. The old marlinspike sea-
man still has a place aboard ship, but his abilities are now
but a part of the intricate knowledge required to operate a
great fighting ship. New rates and new skills have come in-




old Navy hands are prompted to remark in some sadness, "It's
not the same old Navy."
For better or for worse, this statement is undoubtedly
true. In the sense that for long periods of time in the past
the Navy was a more or less static organization, there will
probably never again be a "same old Navy," for whether or not
we approve, the rate of change is ever increasing.
Our Navy has kept pace with the technical advances
in other fields; in fact, many times has been in the vanguard
in the development and application of new scientific prin-
ciples. In the field of personnel administration, however,
many Navy personnel "managers'* went into World War II with
policies little changed from the days of marlinspike seaman-
ship.
The History of Navy Personnel
Admin1 s tra11on
Navy Personnel Prior to 1812
As long as methods of naval warfare remained stable,
the need for trained personnel in the Navy proper was at a
minimum. The American Navy disbanded after the Revolutionary
War with the belief that should war clouds again appear on
the horizon a fighting force could be assembled posthaste
from the merchant ships carrying on the trade of the new
country. Both merchant ships and men o' war were laid down




famous fighting ships of the Revolutionary War had been con-
verted merchantmen. Personnel of the Navy and merchant ma-
rine were required to possess virtually the same skills, and
as long as we had merchant seamen we had no concern about the
availability of trained Navy personnel*
This belief was only partially true in 1812, and
certainly that was the last American war in which there
could be any such assumption made* Even while the War of
1812 was in progress, developments were under way which
were to change all concepts of naval warfare.
The Effect of Steam on Navy Personnel
In 1814 Robert Fulton built the first American war-
ship propelled by steam. He named it the "DEMOLOGOS," Greek
for Mvoice of the people." Unfortunately the ship was not
completed until 1815 when the sea war had ended, and it was
never tried in combat. We regard with amusement today this
primitive steam warship, with its paddlewheel located amid-
ships and heavy wooden armour outboard of the wheel to pre-
vent cannonball damage; but this was little over one-hundred
and twenty-five years ago.
The sailing vessel died hard, but its fate was al-
ready sealed with the DEMOLOGOS. Fulton himself foresaw a
day when there would be no sailing ships, and as is usual
when great inventions come into being, the inventor made a
prediction. According to Brodle, "it was his belief that
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the transference of tactical supremacy to war vessels of
this nature would ultimately serve to abolish war."1 So
it has been with each new, more horrifying invention of de-
struction; its inventors and the more idealistic people of
the day join in hailing it as the savior of the world.
Surely, they say, no human being would use this new instru-
ment of war on other human beings. The historical fact re-
mains that they always have.
The new steam warships had their first test by Euro-
pean navies in the Crimean War, but only for use in bombard-
ing shore batteries. After the Crimean War, many "experts"
stated that:
.... thenceforth there would be no naval battles,
that the victory would be assured in advance to the
side possessing superior engines of destruction.
Preparation for war would be everything, and war it-
self would consist of the simple utilization of in-
struments provided in time of peace. In such a pic-
ture the place of the steam engine loomed large. To
dominate the seas, seamen would no longer be necessary,
but only engineers and money.
2
There was much bewailing of the sad fate that was overtaking
the ancient profession of seafaring. Commentators pointed
out that thenceforth there would be no necessity for skilled
personnel; the operation of the steam warship would be suoh
an automatic procedure that anyone could master its intri-
cacies with very little experience.
iBernard Brodle, Sea Power in the Machine Age










Gunnery, under this new order, would become largely
an automatic procedure. Mechanioally trained and pointed
naval rifles were replacing cannon which were trained by
lines and pulleys, and pointed by the roll of the ship. Ob-
taining skilled personnel would soon be no longer a problem.
So much for the clouded crystal ball of circa 1850.
As we shall see, each technical advance in warfare brought
with it the necessity for longer periods of training for the
personnel who were to utilize the new equipment.
Specialization of work begins .--The widespread adop-
tion of steam as a propelling power had already brought with
it the first major change in personnel policy in hundreds of
years. A group of specialists must be designated as engi-
neering personnel. This condition, which seems so common-
place to us, created no small problem in the American Navy
of the nineteenth century.
Prior to this time, a sailor was an individual who
could perform practically all of the tasks required of a
seagoing man* No questions were asked as to what his spe-
cific abilities were; it was assumed that if he were an able
bodied seaman he was capable of handling the sails, firing
the guns, or carrying out any other order normally given
shipboard personnel. Some individuals became more proficient
than the average at one job or another and became ship's
carpenter, gunner, or cook. They were specializing, but
they still were able to handle the other phases of their
•' h
17
original job. But here a new factor had been introduced;
a group of men who spent their time below decks and knew
little about the traditional pursuits of the men who sailed
ships
•
Deck and engineering sailors got along so poorly at
first that commanding officers despaired of ever getting
agreement between the two; but as time wore on their dif-
ferences were forgotten and they settled down into the armed
truce that has since existed. The wedge had been entered
into the seagoing profession; henceforth the question must
be asked, "You're a sailor? What do you do?"
The Development of Specialization
In the Navy
As more technical advances were made in ships, more
specialization was necessary. Our rating structure began to
develop as the Navy realized that even on deck there was a
limit to the variety of work a man could understand.
Even through World War I, however, the rates were
few in number, and new rates were added slowly. A few new
rates such as radioman, fire controlman, and aviation ma-
chinist's made were added between 1910 and 1930, but each
rate covered a broad field and the men were prepared to take
over any new job which fell in a related field.
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Other Historical Trends In Navy
Personnel Policies
Added responsibility through steam power ,—The advent
of steam power in the Navy had led to more than specialization.
It soon became obvious that if men were to be entrusted with
jobs requiring the responsibility over expensive machinery,
and machinery which was capable of causing death and disaster
to the ship, a modification of the seagoing ideas regarding
discipline must be made. The men were being forced to use a
greater degree of initiative and judgment, and the constant
threat of rigid discipline was bound to undermine the quality
of their work.
This consideration, combined with an ever increasing
emphasis on the rights of the individual in every walk of
American life, began the evolution of an enlightened policy
toward the handling of Navy personnel.
The SOMERS Case .—The strict and sometimes arbitrary
quality of Navy discipline was brought to the foie in 1842
when Captain Alexander Mackenzie, TJ. S. N., held a drumhead
court for mutiny on a midshipman and two enlisted men aboard
the XI. S. S. SOMERS, a training ship. His action seems im-
possible to modern Navy personnel; all three persons were
hanged from the yardarm.
The charge had been poorly proven on the midshipman,
philip Spencer, and the proof of guilt seemed even less con-




Finally, Small* s guilt as a conspirator was doubtful and
there was no proof at all of Cromwell's. From this dis-




The midshipman^ father happened to be the current
Secretary of War, and the case brought down a storm of news-
paper criticism. The Navy received much unfavorable comment
for allowing a system of discipline which permitted the power
of life and death to reside in the hands of one man.
The result of the SOMSRS episode was a revision of
Navy Regulations toward a more liberal Navy. Soon commanding
officers were no longer authorized to carry out the death
penalty. This was an extreme step, for hitherto the captain
of a ship was law unto himself; a hundred years previous no
one would have thought to question this right.
Furthermore, this case pointed out the need for trained
officers. If a man was to have such extreme authority as is
vested in the commanding officer of a ship, he should be ca-
pable and educated in his work. The result of such thinking
was the Naval Academy at Annapolis, founded in 1845
•
The Navy realizes the need for better enlisted men.—
The Navy needed not only better trained and more intelligent
officers; it also needed a higher calibre of enlisted men.
The new era of steam and machinery required men to reason as
well as to possess manual skills. These facts became increas-
^Standards - and Curriculum Division, Training, Bureau
of Naval Personnel, Your Navy (Washington, D. C: Government
Printing Office, 1946), p. 233.
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ingly obvious as equipment became more and more complex.
The answer, however, was not a simple one.
Seagoing was a traditionally rough life. It had
drawn its personnel from the dregs of society; the fugitive
from the law, the ne'er do well, the adventurer with few
scruples. Sailors were near the bottom in the social ladder,
and their behavior warranted little change in this opinion.
Food aboard Navy ships consisted of the customary hardtack
and salt horse. As late as 1864 Navy men sat cross legged
and ate this seagoing fare with oilcloth aprons in their
laps. 4- Sailors' manners and morals were not such at this
time as to cause fond parents' encouragement of their chil-
dren toward a life in the Navy. Something had to be done
to Induce a better class of men to join the naval service,
and the most effective means was to raise the standards and
quality of personnel.
Consequently, in the 1880' s, Admiral Stephen B. Luce,
U. S. N. t launched a training program designed to make sailors
better educated and more acceptable socially. At the same
time he had an eye to morale as he encouraged sports and
recreational programs aboard ship. For the first time,
sailors were furnished with books for their spare time
reading. Courses in English, mathematics, and geography





informed sailor makes a better fighting man as well as a
better citizen.
Much has been done to raise the intellectual level
of Navy personnel. The enlisted man of today, taking a keen
interest in national affairs and consuming avidly the offer-
ings of the ship's library, is a far cry from the ignorant
social misfit of the nineteenth century. However, the Navy
must continue its efforts to gain for its personnel the
social acceptance commensurate with their responsibilities
and abilities.
Personnel Administration in the Modern Navy
The Navy Stagnates Between
World Wars
In the period between World Wars, the size of the
forces afloat was cut down so severely that few recruits
entered the service each year, and the personnel were largely
old hands who remained in each rate many years, To these men
knowing their own jobs with a thoroughness bred of years ex-
perience, a new variation of their familiar work presented
no problem. The traditional ships of the line underwent
little change in this period. In aviation and the submarine
fleet, the personnel grew up along with the changes that were
introduced, but these branches were still considered mere ad-
juncts to the more important battleships and cruisers. Dur-
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100,000. Even on June 30, 1939, the personnel numbered only
110,087; on June 30, 1940, when Europe was already at war,
144,824. There was no particular training problem; to take
care of every new men striking for a rate, there were several
old hands to show him how.
Personnel Expansion During
World War II
Between June, 1940, and December 31, 1941, the Navy
had more than doubled, reaching a size of 330,821. In the
years following 1941, until reaching its peak in 1945, the
personnel increased tenfold. From slightly over three-hun-
dred thousand to over three million men, in the period of
four years.
Specialization in World War II
Along with the increase in numbers, there was a cor-
responding increase in the complexity of jobs. Rates that
formerly had covered a broad field, such as radioman, were
broken down to several new rates covering specific fields in
electronics and radio work. Where the Navy of 1941 had so
few rates that any experienced sailor oould name them all
with ease, by 1945 there were approximately 450 rates and
specialties.
5
5John R. Miles and Charles R. Spain, Audio-Visual
aids in the Armed Services (Washington, D. C: American




The speed with which the Navy grew during World War
II may be only a sample of the speed with which we may have
to mobilize in future wars. In the last war we had England
to hold off the enemy on one side while we fought for exist-
ence on the other side. In the future, we may have to make
this expansion with even less time, for we may not be able to
count on allies to give us time to train men.
We cannot count on great reserves of manpower which
would allow us to profligate with personnel, for in the next
conflict we may not have the majority of numbers on our side.
Such countries as China, Russia, and India outnumber us so
heavily that we must count on using every man to the best ad-
vantage.
For these reasons, the Navy will be forced to depend
on a sound program of personnel administration in order to
utilize its manpower without waste. Suoh a program is being
developed constantly by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
Basic Needs in Detailing Personnel
Classification and training.—Viewed under the exag-
gerated conditions of war mobilization, which obviously are
the conditions in which the chips are down and we are forced
to produce or else, two needs stand out clearly in the hand-
ling of recruits: first, the recognition of aptitudes and
•
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abilities on the part of the personnel, end second, the
training of individuals into the specific abilities and
skills required by the Navy. Looking backward now, we
can see that these conditions always existed, but we never
were forced to recognize them so forcibly because the chips
(and ships) never went down quite so fast or so hard as
they did in 1941.
Billet analysis.—A corollary to these needs is a
third requirement; if we are going to ascertain a meu^s
ability for a specific job and then train him for that job,
we must know what are the techniques and duties of that job.
Hence, we must analyze, or break down, each job into its
component parts and assure ourselves that our job analysis
is accurate for the entire Navy. Such a work description
is called a "billet analysis'1 in the Navy, and while it is
desirable for all rates, it is particularly valuable in the
case of newly established rates about which there is inevi-
tably some confusion.
Care in detailing .—-Once the personnel have been
classified and trained for a job, another factor is intro-
duced. The man who has been trained for a specific job must
be put into that job as soon as possible, and there must be
constant vigilance on the part of individuals engaged in per-
sonnel work to make sure that such trained personnel are not
wasted in work requiring less training and ability.
In order to assure efficient use of trained personnel,
;ldB
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there must be an accounting system which enables officers
engaged in detailing personnel to know at any time how many
men of a specific ability are available, where they are, and
other pertinent facts. This is carried in the Bureau of
Naval Personnel and in other commands issuing orders by means
of machine bookkeeping systems such as the International Busi-
ness Machine equipment. But control in order issuing centers,
however efficient, is not the complete answer.
Care in individual commands.—A vital part in the
optimum utilization of personnel is the intelligent handling
of men in the individual commands. It is of no avail to give
a man extensive classification tests and assign him where his
abilities are needed if the offioers of his ship or station
ignore his qualifications.
The usual reason for misuse of personnel is lack of
understanding on the part of offioers in the field. The in-
dividuals test scores are recorded and placed in his service
record on pages 4A-4B. These scores are based on a simple,
but statistically scientific method, and they show the maj^s
ability as compared to the general population. They indicate
his relative standing in general intelligence as well as in
more specific fields related to the various types of work
aboard ship. The servioe record also shows what, if any,
schools or courses the individual has completed. With this
information, a division officer can draw strikers from a new
draft of men with a reasonable assurance that their work will
I « :
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be satisfactory. The weakness in this seemingly efficient
system is the lack of understanding on the part of officers
as to what the marks mean.
All officers are responsible.—It now becomes ob-
vious as to the implications of one of our basic premises
presented in Chapter One that every officer and petty of-
ficer is a personnel manager ." The responsibility is not
only on the part of the officer vested with the title of
"personnel officer," for in small commands he is usually
a general service officer selected at random from the per-
sonnel available. Even were he specially trained, the
other officers would not be relieved of their duty to under-
stand the meaning of the information presented In service
records, and to make themselves available of this valuable
indication regarding the individual's ability. On this may
depend the smooth functioning of their jobs.
In times of war, the inefficient use of personnel
has been costly; in the greatly ourtailed peacetime insti-
tution, we must have properly placed personnel in order to
lay a sound foundation for rapid expansion. As has been
noted, In future wars the United States may not have the
great pool of manpower that the enemy possesses. It may
be necessary to utilize all available personnel to the opti«





The Development of the Bureau
of Naval Personnel
Historical Background
Origin.—As late as 1942 there was no bureau spe-
cifically designated by name as a personnel agency. The
name that the present Bureau of Naval Personnel held at
that time, "The Bureau of Navigation, indicates that this
bureau had grown up from an organization originally founded
with an altogether different purpose. The background of
the Bureau of Naval Personnel involves many different agen-
cies, all handling personnel at various times in the Navy»s
history.
The Navy Department about 1815 »—-Shortly after 1815,
immediately following the end of the War of 1812, the Navy
Department was composed of three administrative divisions:
the office of the Secretary of the Navy, the office of the
Commissioners (three in number), and the office of the Ac-
countant of the Navy. The office of the Secretary was con-
cerned with personnel, movement of vessels, and discipline.
The office of the Commissioners dealt principally with naval
material, while the Accountant advised the Secretary on naval
matters pertaining to finance.
The Depot of Charts and Instruments .— In 1830 the
Navy established a Depot of Charts and Instruments. This
was the beginning of the Hydrographic Office and the Naval
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Observatory, and also the organization handling observational
work in astronomy, magnetism, and meteorology.
Bureau system established .—In 1842 the Board of
Commissioners and their office were abolished, and the
"bureau system" was established by the Act of 31 August,
1842. This act provided for five bureaus:
The Bureau of Yards and Docks
The Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair
The Bureau of Provisions and Clothing
The Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography
The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
This act is still in effect and is quoted in Navy Regulations:
The business of the Department of the Navy not specifi-
cally assigned by law shall be distributed in such man-
ner as the Secretary of the Navy shall judge to be ex-
pedient and proper among the following bureaus, . . .°
At this time there was no provision made for the han-
dling of personnel. The Secretary's offloe continued to carry
out this function, a weakness of the bureau system which was
not remedied for many years.
At the time the Board of Navy Commissioners was abol-
ished, in 1842, the Hydrographlc Office and Naval Observatory
were put under the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography. This
bureau handled the maintenance of magazines, the manufacture
and issue of ordnance and ammunition, the issuing of naval
^United States Navy Regulations , edition of 1920
(Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, 1941),







charts, and the dissemination of hydrographio information.
Establishment of the Naval Academy,—In 1845 the
Naval Academy was established, and placed under the super-
vision of the office of the Secretary of the Navy, Later
the Bureau of Ordnanoe and Hydrography assumed the duties
of directing the educational and scientific establishments
of the Navy and the Naval Academy was placed under its super-
vision.
Act of 1842 modified ,—On July 5* 1862, Congress
modified the Act of 1842 and established eight bureaus in-
stead of five. These were;
The Bureau of Yards and Docks
The Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting
The Bureau of Navigation
The Bureau of Ordnance
The Bureau of Construction and Repair
The Bureau of Steam Engineering
The Bureau of Provisions and Clothing
The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,
At this time the Hydrographic Office, the Naval Ob-
servatory, and their related duties were transferred to the
Bureau of Navigation, The original purpose of the Bureau of
Navigation was conoeived of as being purely scientific.
The Secretary's Office transferred to the Bureau of
Equipment and Recruiting:
General oversight of the various rendezvous for the
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enlistment of seamen, care and disposition of the
men enlisted, maintaining the records of transfer
and enlistment, directing the transfer of men to
new ships, blanks and forms for discharge and re-
cruiting, correspondence concerning enlisted per-
sonnel, granting of leave, discharges and the pay-
ing off of orews.7
Bureau of Navigation receives first personnel duties ,
—
In 1864 the education and training of naval apprentices was
transferred from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau
of Navigation. This was the first move toward assigning per-
sonnel duties to the Bureau of Navigation.
It is interesting to note that at this time the con-
cept of a central agency handling personnel was not In exist-
ence, nor was there any clear idea regarding the field of
personnel work. The various facets of personnel administration,
as we know it today, were either non-existent or being handled
by several different organizations.
The Office of Detail .—In 1861 Commodore Stringham,
U. S. N., had been detailed to the Office of the Secretary
to assist in detailing officers. Later in the Civil War
these duties were taken over by a board of three officers
known as the Office of Detail. In 1865 this office and its
functions were transferred to the Bureau of Navigation, giv-
ing that bureau its second major personnel function. The
Bureau of Navigation and its successor, the Bureau of Naval
?Excerpt from the Bureau of Navigation Order and
Instruction Book . 22 June, 1936, Issued over /s/ C. W.






Personnel, have had charge of officer detail since 1865 with
the exception of a brief period in 1884, when it was returned
to the Office of the Secretary.
All personnel matters under one bureau.—In 1889 all
the enlisted personnel activities handled by the Bureau of
Equipment and Recruiting were transferred to the Bureau of
Navigation. For the first time, one bureau had authority
over all matters relating to personnel, as the administration
of the Naval Academy was also transferred to the Bureau of
Navigation in 1889.
In order to strike a balance between bureaus, all
the Bureau of Navigation's duties not relating to personnel
were given to the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting. These
included the Hydrographic Office, the Naval Observatory, and
other technical activities. These functions were returned
to the Bureau of Navigation in 1909, when the Bureau of Equip-
ment and Recruiting was virtually abolished.
Bureau of Navigation assumes strong political position .-
Obviously, an office detailing personnel has a strong political
position.
From 1881 to 1911 the Bureau of Navigation became
steadily more powerful. The Office of the Chief of
Bureau adjoined that of the Secretary and as he de-
tailed all junior officers and recommended the as-
signment of offioers of command rank, he exerted a
powerful influence.**
In 1882 the Office of Naval Intelligence was estab-





lished, and placed in the Bureau of Navigation. The head
of this office was also a member of the Board of Construc-
tion; this gave the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation an
opportunity to extend his power over the design of new ships.
Duties of the Bureau of Navigation in 1909 .—By 1909
the duties of the Bureau of Navigation included all matters
relating to the administration of personnel (with the excep-
tion of medical personnel), and virtually all of the duties
performed by the Chief of Naval Operations with the excep-
tion of those functions handled by the War Plans and Central
divisions.
At this time Navy Regulations assigned the following
duties to the Bureau of Navigation:
The duties of the Bureau of Navigation shall com-
prise the promulgation, record, and enforcement of the
orders of the Seoretary to the Fleet and to the officers
of the Navy, except such orders as pertain to the office
of the Secretary; all that relates to the education of
officers and men, including the Naval Academy, the War
College, and technical schools for officers, the appren-
tice seamen establishment, schools for the technical
education of enlisted men, and to the supervision and
control of the Naval Home at Philadelphia, Pa., to the
enlistment and discharge of enlisted personnel, and to
the preparation of estimates for the pay of all officers
and enlisted men.
It shall have under its direction all rendezvous and
receiving ships, and provide transportation for all en-
listed persons under its cognizance.
It shall establish the complement of all ships in
commission.
It shall keep the records of service of all fleets,
squadrons, ships, officers, and men, and prepare an an-
.
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nual navy register for publication.?
Other personnel functions taken over by the Bureau
of Navigation at this time included handling officers' re-
quests for change of duty, forwarding disciplinary problems
to the Secretary of the Navy f and receiving reports of in-
spections and service of personnel. In addition to these
duties involving personnel, the Bureau of Navigation received
numerous miscellaneous military functions which had not been
definitely assigned to any one bureau. This caused a certain
amount of jealousy among other bureaus.
In order to overcome this jealousy the Secretary ap-
pointed four officers to assist and advise him without super-
visory or executive power. They were to deal directly with
the military use of the fleet and give expert military ad-
vice. Their titles were: Aide for Operations, Aide for Per-
sonnel, Aide for Material, and Aide for Inspections. These
officers replaced the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation as
advisers on the subjects for which they were responsible.
The Chief of Naval Operations .—A bill providing
for a Chief of Naval Operations to be responsible for the
operations of the Fleet, and with the preparation and readi-
ness of plans for its use in war, became law on March 3,
1915. The office of Aide for Personnel was abolished; the
offices of Aide for Material and Aide for Inspections have
9Ibid ., pages not numbered.
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been Included in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The original law establishing the Chief of Naval Operations
was modified in 1916 and again in 1924, extending the author-
ity of that office and providing that all orders issued by
the Chief of Naval Operations should be considered as ema-
nating from the Secretary of the Navy.
Reorganization of the Bureau
of Navigation
Nsed for reorganization . --As the Navy prepared for
World War II, it became obvious to many observers that an
organization which had gro\vn so haphazardly as the Bureau
of Navigation 7<as not equipped to handle the greatly in-
creased volume of work with the maximum efficiency. It
was decided to call in technical assistance from business
in order to probe the weaknesses of the bureau.
The Boo2 Report.—The firm of Booz, Fry, Allen and
Hamilton had been engaged in 1940 to conduct studies on the
Navy Department. This Chicago firm of management engineers
commenced a study of the Bureau of Navigation on February
26, 1942. The recommendations of their report, prepared by
Edwin G. Booz, were adopted as a basis for the reorganization
of the bureau.
The Booz report divided the bureau into five primary
elements: procurement, training, distribution, performance,
and welfare. It recommended upgrading of officers in certain
»l. l.> . : -i *>j
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divisions in order to maintain a balanced organization.
The report also showed the need for clear definition
of responsibilities in the bureau, as there was much unneces-
sary duplication of work. There were thirteen division heads
at this time, a number which is excessive when Judged by the
principles of sound business administration, and the divisions
showed a great disparity in size.
Reorganization effected .—Using the recommendations
of the Booz Report and other studies, the Bureau of Navi-
gation effected a thorough organizational revamping. In
1942 the name of the bureau was changed to "Bureau of Naval
Personnel," a title which indicated more accurately its
purposes
•
Utilizing a firm of management engineers in order
to point out their own weaknesses was indicative of the
new Navy policy of calling in expert civilians to advise
in technical fields. These civilian experts played a large
part in the work of the Bureau of Naval Personnel in World
War II, and continue to exert influence in the Bureau 1 s
personnel policies.
Present Organization of the Bureau
of Naval Personnel
Duties of the Bureau of Naval Personnel .—At present
the Bureau of Naval Personnel has as its duties the procure-













The bureau maintains the personnel records of all naval of-
ficers and enlisted men; it administers passenger transpor-
tation of naval personnel and dependents; is responsible for
the formulation of demobilization policy and supervision of
separation of naval personnel; maintains records concerning
medals and awards, as well as handling these awards in an
administrative capacity; judges and attempts to improve per-
formance of both enlisted men and officers; administers wel-
fare funds for the benefit of naval personnel; and carries
on many other activities in the field of personnel adminis-
tration.
A successful personnel organization .—The bureau also
engages in research, planning, and liaison work with other
organizations. It is one of the world f s largest organizations
engaged in personnel administration, with an extensive pro-
gram for the classification of recruits and elaborate machin-
ery for the distribution of personnel. The techniques of
this bureau have improved vastly during the past few years,
and the Navy has built up a personnel program which bids to
be the envy of civilian concerns of comparable size.
More information must be disseminated .—The weakest
link in the Bureau of Naval Personnel's work has been the
difficulty encountered in disseminating information to offi-
cers in the field. Many of these officers have not become
aware of the information and facilities at their disposal,








The Navy f s personnel program Is the basis for the
successful and efficient employment of available personnel;
the program collapses if available information is ignored
through lack of knowledge or carelessness.
Summary and Conclusions
1. After a period of nearly three hundred years In
which the techniques of seafaring were relatively static,
the invention of the steam warship brought about tremendous
changes in the middle 19th century.
2. As new skills were developed, the need for
specialization became obvious. The designation of certain
lnlisted men as engineering specialists was the first step
in this direction.
3. Other trends set in during the nineteenth century.
Living conditions were improved aboard ships of the Navy, and
discipline made less harsh. Sailors became better trained,
better educated, and better mannered, but their social status
has not Improved correspondingly. Improving the social sta-
tus of Navy personnel is a problem which we must continue to
study,
4. In our present Navy, there are virtually count-
less specialties and rates. With equipment becoming con-






5# The techniques for the handling of personnel
have not kept pace with the technical changes in naval war-
fare for the larger part of the past one-hundred years, but
are now beginning to catch up.
6. In order to utilize human talent to the utmost
in an organization as diverse as the Navy, an intelligent
program must be carried out in order to ascertain abilities,
train personnel, and detail them efficiently. A corollary to
these needs is the requirement that we must know of what
duties a billet consists before testing and training per-
sonnel for it. Hency, the Navy has developed the "billet
analysis. w
7. The organization handling the administration of
personnel in the Navy is the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Com-
bining all the personnel functions into one bureau was a late
development in the Navy's history, indicating the general
lack of understanding of the nature of personnel problems
until very recently.
8. The Bureau of Naval Personnel has developed an
efficient organization for the classification and distri-
bution of enlisted personnel. In the long run, however,
this program will be only as effective as the officers in
the field who administer it. For this reason, every of-
ficer and petty officer must consider himself a personnel






THE NAVY PERSONNEL PROGRAM
Introduction
Chapter I discussed the scope of personnel adminis-
tration in business and viewed the application of its prin-
ciples to the Navy situation. Chapter II dealt with the
historical background of Navy personnel trends and showed
how the need for an integrated and comprehensive personnel
program was brought home forcibly by the rapid expansion of
World War II. This chapter will discuss the personnel pro-
gram which has been developed by the United States Navy and
discuss some of Its Implications.
Probably no two experts in Navy personnel work would
agree on the headings used in a breakdown of this subject
into a few major fields. There are so many sub-headings in
each field which, when investigated, reveal an unsuspected
importance, that each specialist considers his specific sub-
ject of major significance. For the purposes of an intro-
ductory discussion such as this, the subject will be divided
into the following major fields:
1. Classification and distribution. This field in-
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individual differences, aptitude and ability
testing, and the distribution of personnel on
the basis of these factors,
2. Training, Under this heading are grouped re-
cruit training, Navy school training, and on-
the-job training
•
3« Motivation, Under this heading will be con-
sidered motivation with its related fields of
discipline and performance*
4. Personnel welfare and morale, Tfois heading
includes welfare programs, morale of personnel,
and mental hygiene.
The Classification and Distribution Program
Billet Analysis
The nature of Navy .jobs ,—In order for personnel to
be classified with regard to their abilities in specific
fields, or for specific jobs, it is necessary for the per-
sonnel administrator to know of what factors those fields
and jobs consist. Similarly, training cannot be effective
unless it is known for what the individual is being trained.
Finally, a man's performance cannot be Judged unless one is
aware of the desired ends of the man's performance.
Billet analysis prior to World War II .—There was
no coordinated program of billet analysis prior to World










took to break down billets in order to solve their own prob-
lems, but such work was neither uniform nor scientific.
Billet analysis during World Warr II .—»In the early-
part of World War II billet analysis continued to be carried
out by individual ships and stations and also by research
groups under contract to study specific problems. It was
not until the fall of 1943 that a centralized program of
work analysis was established in the Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel.
Two staffs were organized, one for the purpose of
studying officer and the other enlisted personnel. The
work of the staff analyzing enlisted billets dealt with
several types of studies, of which the most important were
studies of naval ratings and studies of complement require-
ments by types of ships.
Studies of naval ratings undertook to analyze the
work of each rating. This project had as its ultimate goal
a description of each rating, such as storekeeper or quarter-
master, with a breakdown into pay grades, such as storekeeper
first class, storekeeper second class, etc. These descrip-
tions attempted to outline the duties, responsibilities,
knowledge, and physical skills required; personal character-
istics, such as temperament, which were considered desirable;
and the tools or equipment the man would be required to use.
During the war, emphasis was placed on critical ratings;





Whereas studies of ratings were to include billets
on all types of ships and stations, other studies were under-
taken to analyze all the billet requirements on one type of
ship. Such studies were based on the complement for that
type ship and upon typical organizations of duty assignments.
Specifications for a given type of ship usually included de-
scriptions of billets, together with statements of the usual
rates assigned and the performance requirements of the ship's
billets.
Studies of ship types were particularly valuable to
commands putting into commission ships of a new type, such
as the destroyer escort and the various amphibious craft.
It is the ultimate aim of the Bureau of Naval Personnel to
provide these studies for all types of naval vessels.
Billet analysis in the post-war Navy,—A research
activity has been formed in the Bureau of Naval Personnel
which has as its purpose carrying on the billet analysis
work commenced during World War II, Inasmuch as this ac-
tivity is likely to have a small staff, the success of its
work will depend to a large extent upon cooperation from
the officers in the field.
The need for peacetime study in this field should
be obvious to the student of personnel administration, for
there has been demonstrated the need for machinery designed
to permit the speedy expansion of our Navy to a wartime basis.






rates are needed aboard each type ship and what the individ-
uals in these rates are required to know and do*
Individual Differences
Individuals differ in all respects —It is apparent
to the casual observer that no two men are alike. Human be-
ings are not equipped with a standard physique, personality,
or intelligence. The physical characteristics of an individ-
ual are easily observed and described, but there are person-
ality and intellectual differences which are far more subtle.
In any case, the efficient use of manpower requires that we
recognize these differences and place personnel accordingly.
Sociological and psychological studies make much of
this subject of individual differences. Indeed, groups of
erudite scientists belabor the point until one wonders if
they might feel they were the first persons to notice that
some persons are brighter than their fellows, others more
nervous, and still others better equipped with what we like
to call "common sense." However, a conception of these dif-
ferences is of great value to the personnel administrator.
Recognizing physical differences .—The recognition
of physical differences presents no serious problem to the
capable officer. Obviously it would be folly to place a
frail individual on a job requiring great physical strength
and endurance, or to assign a large man to duties requiring
his maneuvering in a constricted space. Similarly, a look-










boatswain* s mate be equipped with a clarion voice • These
are considerations which the average Navy "personnel man-
ager" has recognized without ever realizing that he was
taking into account the doctrine of individual differences.
Recognizing temperamental differences .—Somewhat
more difficult to recognize are the temperamental differ-
ences which are present in personnel. One tends to describe
individuals as "calm," "excitable," "a good leader," "a
follower," or in any one of a hundred different stereotyped
manners. This merely indicates that there has been noticed,
in a general way, the personality differences that exist.
One is not always sure, however, how the facets of a certain
personality will react to a specific type of job.
Upon giving a little thought to the problem, it is
possible to recognize the error in placing men in jobs for
which their temperaments obviously do not fit them. For in-
stance, a nervous, high-strung individual is likely to be
extremely unhappy if compelled to watch a radar screen over
long periods of time, whereas a phlegmatic individual might
be very happy to receive this opportunity to work sitting
down. Much work remains to be done in this field, for there
is really very little known about personality patterns; how-
ever, we can apply the available knowledge to the Navy per-
sonnel situation.
Recognizing differences in ability .—The enlisted








ability from a low of dull-normal to a high of genius or
near genius. At present, the average is at an intelligence
quotient of about 90, which means that it is ten points be-
low the average for the general population. The majority
of individuals coming into the Navy at present fall between
80 and 100.
In an organization as large and diverse as the Navy,
there is enough variety of work to absorb individuals at any
point on this range of Intelligence, l^ie major consideration
is to utilize the above average person in a job requiring his
mental abilities, for this will serve to benefit the Navy as
well as to improve the morale of the individual.
Besides differing in general mental ability, individ-
uals differ in specific traits such as mechanical aptitude,
clerical aptitude, and in any other specific ability which
is needed in the Navy. Although there is a good correlation
between general intelligence and aptitude in specific fields,
the example of the dull boy who is "mechanically inclined" is
too common to require amplification on this point. These
specific traits must be taken into consideration in order
to utilize manpower to the maximum.
Finally, there are many individuals who come into
the Navy prepared to carry out more or less complex tasks
by virtue of their previous training. Their level of per-





Aptitude Testing and Classification Procedures
Prior to World War II ,—The United States Navy used
psychological tests to determine recruits » mental abilities
as early as 1912, but there was no organized testing program
until 1923. * In 1924 the Training Division was established
in the Bureau of Navigation, and a General Classification
Test was instituted in training stations to select enlisted
men for Navy Schools. Beginning in 1931 this test was given
at recruiting stations and was used to eliminate unfit men
at the recruiting level. Although psychological testing for
the purpose of selecting and classifying personnel was not
emphasized prior to 1939, beginning in 1931 recruits arriving
at training stations were given the following examinations:
0*Rourke General Classification Test, Junior Grade,
(U. S. Navy edition)
Mechanical Aptitude Test, Junior Grade, (U, S. Navy
edition)
Standard Test in Arithmetic
Standard Test in English
Standard Test in Spelling
Radio Code Aptitude Test
The scores on these tests were entered in the individual's
service reoord and could be taken into consideration on as-
^Frederiok B. Davis, Utilizing Human Talent (Wash-
ington, D. C: American Council on Education. 194?), p. 14.
The History of the Bureau of Naval Personnel [unpublished
Navy Department report), Washington, D. C # , 1945 (typed),
P« 5-1, gives this date as "1924 •"
*0 Ml.
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slgnment. However, little use was made of them at this time.
This battery of tests was in use in December, 1941.
The testing program during World War II .—Although
the tests used in 1941 had been satisfactory for the peace-
time Navy, they proved inadequate as the pressure became
greater for filling quotas for training schools from the
personnel available. Many men being sent from training
stations to school courses were unable to complete the
courses, and requests began to come into the Bureau of Naval
Personnel for tests which would indicate more adequately the
recruits' abilities for specific ratings.
Training personnel were also finding that the tests
used in selecting school personnel did not differentiate,
for example, between good candidates for radioman sohool
and storekeeper school.
Many schools and stations were developing "home
grown" tests to determine specific abilities. In order to
meet the demand for these tests, the Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel commissioned several psychologists to work in that
bureau and enlisted the assistance of the Office of Scientific
Research and Development. The first of several projects car-
ried out under the auspices of this office was initiated im-
mediately, and a Test and Research Section was organized in
the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
After the assignment of men to the Navy by Selective
Service began in 1943, the seventeen-year-olds who volun-




aptitude and for special programs as radio technicians, hos-
pital corpsmen, combat aircrewmen, and other specific duty
assignments
Among the men assigned to the Navy by Selective Ser-
vioe were a few illiterates, who presented a new problem to
the naval training program, Speoial tests and training pro-
grams were set up to prepare them for duty status.
Literate men accepted by the Navy were given a series
of tests at training stations. This Basic Test Battery was
used in order to determine to which training sohool the most
promising should be sent, or which specialized technical-
training test they should be given. The tests included in




Mechanical-Aptitude Test (Mechanical Score)
Mechanical-Knowledge Test (Electrical Score)
Clerical-Aptitude Test
Spelling Test
Radio Code Test—Speed of Response
Other tests, such as the Sonar Pitch Memory Test,
were given to some men who had been found qualified for more
specialized training by the Basic Test Battery.
The Scores of all tests were recorded on each man's
Enlisted Personnel Qualifications Card along with pertinent
i ^m
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information concerning his civilian training and experience,
his hobbies, and his interests. This material was available
when the man was interviewed for the purpose of recommending
a training or duty assignment. The Enlisted Personnel Quali-
fications Card was made a part of each man's service record
and was available throughout his Navy career for the purpose
of determining further assignment.
This information was invaluable in assignment of
personnel to service schools and special duties. Approxi-
mately forty percent of all recruits were sent from training
centers to elementary training sohools at this time, and
about ten percent were assigned to special duty. Many of the
individuals sent to special duty were immediately given a
rate or recommended for a commission. The remainder of the
men were sent to general detail. Had this classification
system been adopted earlier in the war, the percentage of
men assigned to general detail could have been decreased and
the individuals talents used more effectively
The Navy Standard Score .—In order to indicate the
individuals standing with relation to the abilities of the
general population, the Navy has adopted a scoring scale
known as the Navy Standard Score. The marks entered in the
individual's Service Record, pages 4A-4B, cover a theoretical
range of from to 100. On this scale, 50 is the mean, or
average, mark for the general population. A score of 30 indi*
cates that the individual has bested only 2.28 percent of the
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general population; a score of 40, he has exceeded 15*87
percent; 50, he has exceeded 50 percent; 60, he has bested
84.13 percent; and 70, he has exceeded 97.72 percent of the
general population.
These scores give a quick and easily understandable
indication of the individual's ability as measured by the
aptitude and ability tests administered by the Navy.
Classification procedures In World War II .—By August,
1945, the Navy had over one thousand classification officers
and enlisted interviewers. These individuals had been trained
to make proper use of the test scores and other data entered
on the Personnel Qualifications Card. They were placed in
over one hundred different types of naval installations.
If a man had had civilian experience in a job which
had a Navy counterpart, he was usually recommended for as-
signment to the Navy job for which his civilian training
qualified him. In such cases, the aptitude scores were used
merely as a general indication of the man's learning ability.
For younger recruits, whose vocational experience was generally
limited, the aptitude-test scores were of muoh greater value
in making school or duty assignments.
Classification and reclassification of men accomplished
many other purposes. At precommissioning centers, crews of
ships under construction were balanced to insure a reasonable
distribution of abilities aboard the new ship. Receiving







emits going to sea for the first time, and to reassign ex-
perienced men coming from sea duty. Experienced men found
capable of benefiting by advanced training courses were
screened and assigned to training schools at receiving sta-
tions.
Each naval district maintained a personnel staff for
the purpose of assigning men to duty in keeping with quali-
fications and experience. District personnel officers and
their staffs interviewed individuals coming into their dis-
tricts for reassignment in order to accomplish this purpose.
District personnel-classification officers coordinated clas-
sification functions of all activities in their districts.
In service schools, classification work was oarried
on mainly at a counseling level. This served the purpose of
maintaining Interest and occasionally of effecting reclassi-
fication when the individual was obviously unfitted for the
school assignment.
At sea, specially trained classification officers
were found only on the largest units of the fleet, but clas-
sification service was provided to almost two thousand com-
bat and auxiliary vessels by trained personnel teams from
classification centers.
The peacetime classification program.—The wartime
classification procedures have been adapted to the pe. oe-
time Navy and are being carried out in naval training cen-
ters and other personnel distribution units. Recruits are
•:
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Interviewing and reclassification are being carried
on in the same manner and with the same purposes as in the
wartime organization. Men in the fleet who have not pre-
viously been tested are being given the Basic Test Battery
as they come ashore for training or new duty.
The need for efficient use of personnel can be seen
clearly in the peacetime institution, for with the current
type of recruit the Navy does not have a surplus of ability
to waste. Recruits are youthful and inexperienced; combined
with this, the average of ability among recruits is lower
than that of the general population. The Navy's human re-
sources must be husbanded carefully in order to build a firm
foundation for wartime expansion.
Training
The Need for Training
Under the apprentice system of the old Navy, each
new recruit was supervised by several experienced sailors
who were familiar with all phases of the work in which the
recruit was to be indoctrinated. This system worked very
successfully as long as the size of the Navy remained stable




and the introduction of new techniques was gradual.
With the rapid wartime expansion of the naval estab-
lishment and the simultaneous introduction of many new tech-
nical advances in material , it became obvious that the ap-
prentice system could not cope with the situation.
The Navy operated a training school system at the
beginning of World War II 9 but this organization was inade-
quate to take care of the expansion of personnel* It was
found necessary to expand the existing schools and to de-
velop many new training schools to take care of training
for new equipment. In addition, the Navy had to revise many
of its traditional teaching methods and apply the principles
of modern education.
Educational Basis of the
Training Program
The Navy oalls in civilian educators ,—As the need
for better educational methods became clear to the Navy,
civilian educators were recruited from leading educational
institutions and given the Job of revamping the existing
training philosophy. These men applied to Navy training
the accumulated learnings of generations of educational re-
search* Approaching the Navy situation in a scientific
manner, they arrived at some basic considerations to be
taken into account in the training of Navy personnel.










three major reasons for Navy Training:
1. The man must be indoctrinated into the Navy way
of life.—New recruits must be made to feel at
home in the Navy, The change from civilian life
is so great that they must be indoctrinated into
this new way of living. Ihis indoctrination in-
cludes teaching recruits naval customs and cour-
tesies. It also shows them the need for naval
discipline, and teaches them to accept it as a
part of their daily lives, and it points out to
recruits their places in the Navy.
2. The man must be given vocational knowledge and
skills.—Whether the recruit has followed a ci-
vilian profession or Is a raw schoolboy, he must
be taught the techniques of the Navy job which
he will perform. This is accomplished by occu-
pational training.
3. The man must learn to function as a member of a
team.—The Navy fights as a team. The Individual
must learn to work with other members of his spe-
cific team and with the other teams that make up
the naval organization.
The curriculum.—All of the learning activities of
an organization oomblne to make up its curriculum. A school
curriculum is a planned course designed to achieve certain
educational objectives and presented in a prescribed number






of classroom sessions. In referring to the plan for the
eduoational work of any activity, the plan is called a
"curriculum outline. " This curriculum outline usually in-
cludes a list of objectives, the attainment of which is the
reason for the creation of the activity.
In the Navy, the recruit is surrounded by an entirely
new life that becomes his curriculum, for he is continually
learning from his life situation. In addition to this, a
Navy training course has a planned ourriculum which has been
carefully outlined.
In building up the currioulum it is necessary first
to understand what abilities are desired as a result of the
course. The billet analysis is invaluable in this respect,
as it gives us a basis for our objectives. Starting with
this in mind, naval educators can decide what activities are
to be emphasized in the learning situation.
The instructor.—Mere familiarity with a subject
does not qualify a man to be a successful instructor. The
instructor must have a background of knowledge concerning
teaching techniques along with such characteristics as a
good voioe, pleasing personality, organizational ability,
the desire to teach, and the ability to work with others.
In order to give instructors the knowledge of teach-
ing techniques which they will find necessary in their work,
the Navy has instituted an Instructor Training Program de-
signed to acquaint instructors with lesson plans, methods of
ft DftX.
.
•v. • .. ..v
£w an
*Xlft£llq«» ftCf
©iff ,*D liMIOII J #r!
57
delivery, the use of training aids, evaluation of pupil per-
formance, and other information which they will find essential
to good instruction.
Training Aids
Background of the training aids program .—The devel-
opment of training aids was another outgrowth of the rapid
expansion during World War II. The Navy had made sporadic
attempts to use pictures in naval training as long ago as
World War I, but not until August, 1941 f was any serious,
continuing effort made to use pictures throughout the Navy. 2
With the great demand for better training procedures brought
about by the need for trained personnel, schools were forced
to set up training programs, develop or procure instructional
materials, establish instruetor-training programs, and de-
vise techniques for improving the competence of their gradu-
ates.
The armed services could and did throw into the
breach the almost unlimited resources at their command.
During the years of the war, the services developed the most
comprehensive audio-visual aid program that had ever been
conceived. In this field the Army and Navy set the pattern
for civilian educational institutions, and leading univer-
sities are instituting such programs, some with former naval








Nature of training aids *—The term "training aids"
may include a variety of instructional materials, For the
purposes of clarity, we can break them down into the follow-
ing categories: graphic materials, demonstration and prac-
tice devices, projection materials and devices, and auditory
devices,
Graphics.—Graphics include visual materials such as
charts, graphs, maps, cartoons, and schematic drawings.
Often several types of these aids are combined into graphic
portfolios or "transvision" booklets which illustrate a
series of steps or break down the construction of a pieoe
of material. An example of the latter is the series on
Diesel installations found on Navy ships, which show various
aspects of the engine in cutaway as the pages are turned.
Posters.—Posters are differentiated from graphics
in that they are designed to contain personal appeal, and
often have an emotional basis. Thus posters are used to
prevent accidents or to remind personnel that casual infor-
mation may be of use to the enemy. They are also used in
the learning situation as in the case of the Navy knot-tying
posters.
Demonstrations and devices.—Various types of devices
^Comdr. J. Sterling Livingston, SC, USNR, who pro-
duced training films for the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts,
now is in charge of the Audio-Visual Aid program of the Harvard













are used both in demonstrations and in simulating actual
equipment in the practice situation. In many fields these
synthetic trainers are given wide reliance by training of-
ficers
.
Projection materials and devices.—This includes
still-projecting devices, film strips, and motion pictures.
The Catalog of Training Films for the Navy. L'arlne Corps .
and Coast Guard listed approximately 9,000 films as available
in 1945.^ The Navy is continuing with the production of
these films, and they can be obtained to cover virtually
all phases of Navy training.
Auditory devices.—Auditory devices have been used
extensively in many phases of training, but especially in
aviation. They are particularly valuable in teaching com-
munications. Disc recordings, magnetic-tape, and wire re-
corders are used in this field. Besides teaching such ma-
terial as Morse Code, auditory devices are used to simulate
actual battle noises, shipboard calls, commands, or marching
music. Recorded lectures are also available for training
purposes, and recorded material has been found extremely
valuable in teaching foreign languages.
The use of training aids .—Training aids cannot be
considered as an end in themselves. Unless the instructor
is thoroughly familiar with the material to be presented and
frlbld .. p. 28.
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prepares the students for the training aid, the material is
partially ineffective.
The Military training Division of the ASP planned and
effected an experiment to determine the value of a brief
talk given prior to the showing of a one-hour training
film dealing with methods of map reading. Three groups
of trainees constituted the subjects of the experiment.
Group A did not see the film and had no instruction;
Group B saw the film but had no preliminary instruction;
and Group C saw the film and had a brief introductory
talk. A factual test was then administered to all three
groups with the following average scores in each group:
Group A, 20; Group B t 29; and Group C, 35.*
Further experiments showed that the increase in factual knowl-
edge retained was greatest in difficult material, in groups
with low motivation, and in groups of average and low intel-
ligence."
In an attempt to improve the effectiveness of train-
ing aids, special courses are given to instructors which out-
line the best methods of presenting such material. In the
hands of a skilled instructor, audio-visual aids are a valu-
able supplementary means of presenting educational material.
The Educational Services Program
In order to educate naval personnel in non-occupa-
tional subjects, the Educational Services Program offers
material in virtually any academic or vocational field.
This program has as its purpose raising the general level
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or audio-visual aids on a wide variety of subjects.
Implications of the Training Program
It was stated in the first ohapter that personnel
administration is largely a matter of training. In order
for Navy personnel to cope with increasingly complex equip-
ment it is necessary for the Navy to carry on a continuous
training, both in official training institutions and on-the-
job. It is also very desirable to raise the general level
of education in the Navy f for this makes better citizens of
naval personnel and increases their usefulness both in the
Navy and the civilian world.
Motivation, Discipline, and Performance
Motivation
Definition ,—Motivation may be defined as the exist-
ence of a will in the individual to carry on to the best of
his ability. This will is influenced by the existence of
certain psychological, physical, and social conditions.
These conditions may be listed as appetites, such as hunger,
thirst, need for sleep, the sex drive, and general physical
well-being; the emotions, such as fear or anger; feelings
and attitudes, which have been built up toward various situ-
ations; social influence, such as approval, recognition, and
security; and other motives, such as habits or environment.

Basic considerations In motivation ,—In order for a
man to be motivated toward carrying on the maximum possible
amount and quality of work, he must be well-fed, healthy,
rested, and in a general state of physical well-being. There
are many examples of individuals who performed superhuman feats
without the existence of these conditions, but in the long run
a satisfactory physical state is necessary for good motivation.
These conditions are such that officers can maintain them with
proper supervision, and it is the responsibility of all of-
ficers to supervise commands in such a way that conditions
conducive to good work are existent.
Emotions can often be utilized if directed properly*
The individual who is angry can often be convinced that his
anger should be directed against the enemy or against some
intangible factor which he can defeat by good work.
In the field of feelings and attitudes, educational
work must shape and direct opinions as much as possible in
order to gain favorable esprit de corps among personnel.
This is a big order, but one on which much work has been
done by Navy psychologists. Various publications have been
put out with the idea of gaining a favorable attitude on
the part of personnel, and this work is continuing.
Probably the most important factors in gaining the
desired morale among personnel are the establishment of a
feeling of security in the individual, and building up the
realization that the man has been recognized as an important
jmb m
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individual in the Navy organization • These two factors of
security and recognition are stressed strongly in all busi-
ness studies which attempt to analyze morale among workers.
Discipline
Positive discipline*—Men who are properly motivated
in their work are seldom disciplinary problems. The exist-
ence of morale has already disciplined them with what is
known as positive discipline. This consists of a will in
the individual to do what is expected of him, and the pride
in his work and self that prevents his getting into trouble.
In order for this condition of positive discipline
to function effectively, the men must be well suited to their
jobs, well trained, in a favorable environment, and motivated
in their work. The leader who can achieve these conditions
will have few disciplinary oases.
Negative discipline.—In the field of negative disci-
pline, or discipline through fear of punishment, the greatest
caution must be used. Men must never feel that punishment
is personalized or vindictive. Sentences must be uniform
for all offenders committing a like offense.
It must be remembered that in negative discipline
it is the certainty of punishment and not the severity of
punishment that is the important factor. Once punishment
has been administered it should be forgotten, on the theory
that the price has been paid. Only in the case of habitual
Xb***i
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offenders should previous offenses be taken into consider-
ation in the subsequent treatment of the individual. Anger
should never enter into the administration of punishment.
The penalty should give an inoentive to remedy the error,
rather than taking away the individual's self-confidence
and embittering him.
Performance
The proper evaluation of performance on the part of
personnel administrators handling enlisted men is an impor-
tant part of a good personnel program. In order for the
Navy to Improve the individual's level of performance, it
is necessary to establish a sound criterion for judging per-
formance.
The Navy attempts to judge its personnel's work in
the quarterly marks assigned enlisted men. However, too
many times these marks are passed out on the basis of rating;
that is, chief petty officers receive a mark of 4.0, first
class petty officers a mark of 3.9, and so on down the scale.
This type of marking must be changed if the evaluation is to
be meaningful.
Furthermore, this marking basis gives very little
information concerning the man's real performance. It would
be valuable to have a more detailed account of specific abili-
ties, particularly in the oase of the higher rated men such
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ones prepared for officers might be utilized in this respect.
Various types of tests and measurements are avail-
able for judging the quality of an individual's work* In
the Navy, the close personal contact of an officer with his
men should enable him to make a good evaluation on the basis
of experience. His judgment should be carried over into
marking men objectively, and stimulating them to improve
performance
.
The improvement of performance can be brought about
by the correct selection of men for jobs, scientific moti-
vation, adequate training, and good morale. In all these
fields the Navy is expanding its research program with the
purpose of achieving the optimum utilization of its person-
nel.
Personnel Welfare and Morale
General Considerations
As has been pointed out earlier, good morale is es-
sential to gaining the maximum output of work from personnel.
Morale is built up by a number of intangibles, such as the
influence of individual personalities and the esprit de corps
of an organization which influences newcomers. Along with
these factors are the more easily recognized environmental
Influences described under motivations.









cerning morale, the Navy utilizes a personnel program desig-
nated as the welfare and recreation program. This involves
a conscious effort to supply to Navy personnel the tyj>es of
entertainment and recreation that is desired, so far as is
possible in the naval organization, and to offer a certain
amount of mental hygiene through counseling and religion,
as exemplified by the duties of the Chaplain Corps.
Welfare and Recreation Programs
Providing funds .---Funds are provided for Navy rec-
reational programs through money appropriated by Congress
and profits made by ships 1 stores or ships 1 service stores.
Administration of funds .—Funds are administered by
welfare officers in the individual commands, with the approval
of the commanding officer. Many commands have found it de-
sirable to establish a council of enlisted men from the va-
rious divisions to represent the majority in deciding how
the money is to be spent.
Types of welfare activities .—Entertainment, both
professional and from the individual command, is supplied
personnel. Group participation is encouraged wherever pos-
sible. Sporting events, ship's dances, encouragement and
financing of hobbies, motion pictures, maintenance of en-
listed men f s clubs, and any other type of recreation ap-
propriate to the area is provided under this program.
iHi
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A vital part of the Navy's personnel program is
concerned with keeping personnel in a sound frame of mind.
This is called mental hygiene. It consists of maintaining
a healthy outlook on life for those with no mental problems
and redirecting individuals who have developed personality
conflicts.
In this field of mental hygiene the individual is
often benefited by merely being able to express himself to
a sympathetic listener. The chaplain can be of great im-
portance in this respect. One authority, speaking of the
Army, gives his values to the servioe as follows:
1. He represents another authority than the mili-
tary and will be sought out for the very rea-
son that his primary concern is with "souls."
2. If he is worthy of his calling, he will be sym-
pathetic and understanding. The individual
coming to him will not feel himself a "mere
number" as is often the case in his contact
with the rest of the military. The chaplain
treats him as a human being, an individual,
a friend. This alone may be decisive in a
potential neurosis.
3. The chaplain who is capable of listening can
furnish a counterfoil against which the soldier
can think out his troubles. Sometimes the man
can solve his problem in the course of talking,
without a word of specific advice.
4. Even the untrained chaplain is more objective
than the man caught up in the turmoil of his
own problem. He may be able on a purely oom-
monsense basis to point out factors which-the
soldier has been ignoring or overlooking.'
?W. Edgar Gregory, "The Chaplain and Mental Hygiene,"





This authority goes on to state that the most com-
mon needs among chaplains are (1) a broad religious back-
ground covering all groups, and (2) training in counseling
and psychiatry. Equipped with these two essentials, the
chaplain can be of great help in the Navy.
Some work has been done to provide Navy personnel
with trained counselors who can listen to the individual's
problems and aid him in rearranging his mental processes
.
The majority of the work in this field, however, must be
carried out by officers in the general service who have a
degree of insight into the principles involved. There is
undoubtedly a broad field of work to be done, and further
attempts in mental hygiene can be expected in the naval
organization with a resultant benefit in morale.
Summary and Conclusions
1. Navy personnel administration can be broken down
into four major fields. These are: Classification and dis-
tribution, training, motivation, and personnel welfare.
2. The first step in classification is to analyze
the jobs for which the Navy is classifying the individual.
This is accomplished by means of a billet analysis.
3. In classifying men it is essential to recognize
the fact that men differ in all respects and to take these
differences into consideration.
4. Aptitude tests give a reliable and valid Indication

of the individual's standing with regard to the general
population. Tests may be given to test personnel for a
variety of specific traits as well as general intelligence.
5. Information gained by aptitude and ability test-
ing is available on the individual's service record, pages
4A-4B, and is indicated by a mark based on the Navy Standard
Score
i
6. The Navy utilizes trained personnel to classify
and reclassify enlisted personnel on the basis of their test
scores and personal interviews.
7. Distribution centers accomplish the assigning of
personnel on the basis of Individual qualifications and ser-
vice needs.
8. World War II brought about the expansion of the
Navy's training program as existing facilities were found
inadequate. Trained educators were called in to bring their
professional skills to bear upon the Navy situation.
9. An important development of service training
during World War II was the audio-visual aid program. These
training aids can be of great assistance to instructors when
used properly and with adequate preparation of students.
10. Once personnel have been properly classified,
trained, and assigned, another condition remains necessary
in order for them to produce their best efforts; they must
have the will to carry on to the best of their ability.
This condition is called motivation.
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11. Motivation depends on the existence of proper
physical, psychological, and social conditions. Leadership
techniques which take these factors into account will be
more effective in the long run than those based on a purely
personal or emotional appeal.
12. Discipline can he broken down into two broad
fields, positive and negative discipline. Of these two,
positive discipline is the more valuable, for its existence
prevents disciplinary problems from arising,
13. Negative discipline has its place in the Navy,
but it must be carefully oonceived and carried out.
14. The proper evaluation of performance is neces-
sary in order to improve the level of performance.
15 Good morale is built up by a number of factors,
among which is the planned welfare and recreation program of
the Navy.
16. The Navy is concerned with the mental health of
its personnel, for this is a prerequisite to good performance.
The work of mental hygiene can be carried out by chaplains,
by trained counselors, or by other naval personnel with in-
sight into the principles of mental health.

CHAPTER IV
SOMES FROBIBMS OF NAVY PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
Introduotlon
Every organization has specific problems peculiar to
its personnel situation, some of which are inherent in the
type of organization and others of which are constantly shift-
ing as the needs and conditions change.
Many of the Navy's problems have already been dis-
cussed in the preceding chapters. There are other problems,
mostly of a short run nature, which currently beset the naval
personnel administrator. In some cases, there seem to be no
immediate solutions available; in others, the solutions sug-
gested by various authorities are so controversial as to
warn naval administrators that a partially satisfactory sta-
tus quo is often better than untried change.
With this in mind, the discussion presented in this
final chapter will be as objective as possible, with tenta-
tive recommendations offered only when the fundamental ten-




Lack of Motivation for Advancement
In Rate
The Condition
It has been observed by many experienced officers
that there currently exists in the Navy a low motivation
toward striving for advancement in rate among enlisted men,
particularly men of the lower rates or non-rated men. This
is a cause for major concern, for this lack of interest in
advancement decreases learning and lowers the general morale
of the service.
The Causes
Lack of opportunity for advancement .—At the end of
World War H the United States Navy found itself over-sup-
plied with higher rated petty officers in certain ratings.
Reserves who were in the lower pay grades did not choose to
make the Navy a career as frequently as did those in the
higher rates. The Navy had not made rates temporary until
late in the war, with the result that it was burdened with
a disproportionate gradation of enlisted men. This situation
blocks the opportunity for recruits to advance to the higher
ratings in certain fields.
Improbability of "getting to the top ."—The Navy
places a large block in the way of capable enlisted men who




jobs. The same block is present in civilian concerns, but
is not so obvious as there is not such a clearly defined
line as between officers and enlisted men. While recent
legislation makes promotion into the officer group more
probable, there still exists a greater gap than would be
found in most civilian promotion plans.
In order for an enlisted man to become a successful
officer he must be possessed of unusual ability. His formal
training has been inferior to that of the graduates of the
Naval Academy or other colleges, and this places him at a
disadvantage. It is questionable whether or not the Navy
should wish the change the status quo in this respect. How-
ever, the small opportunity for advancement into the officer
brackets tends to kill initiative, particularly in the case
of chief petty officers who feel that the step up to warrant
or commissioned grade is so difficult that they may as well




—A large number of indi-
viduals currently serving out enlistments in the Navy have
as their major objective getting out of the service and tak-
ing advantage of the provisions of the G. I. Bill of Rights.
Many wish to go on to college at the governments expense.
However desirable this desire for self-improvement may be,
it creates an attitude toward the Navy which does not permit
maximum motivation.




personnel will not be eligible for these benefits, and all
Navy men will be volunteers who wish to make the service a
career or at least are desirous of getting the most out of
their tour of duty. In the meantime, efforts must be made
to utilize the "short-timers" as well as possible.
The Negro Problem
Background of Negroes in the Navy
Early history .—Negro personnel were quite common in
Continental and State navies during the Revolutionary War
and the War of 1812, In this period they composed from ten
to twenty percent of the Navy»s crews, and there was little
segregation. White and colored sailors messed together with
no apparent friction.
During the Civil War colored troops were not allowed
in the Union Army until late 1862, but they were shipped in
the Union Navy throughout the war. In the early years their
number was restricted to five percent of the total strength,
but later the rules were relaxed as many slaves escaped and
found refuge in the Navy. At first they were shipped as
"boys," a rate which paid #10, a month and keep. The Army
paid them only $8. and took back $6. for keep, which made
the Negroes prefer the naval service.
In 1863-64 an estimated twenty-six percent of the
^-Herbert Aptheker, "The Negro in the Union Navy,"




Navy f s crews were Negroes, according to the Superintendent
of Naval War Records Office figure. This made a total of
2
about 29,511 individuals.
During the latter part of the war they were allowed
to ship as "landsmen, " a rate just above nboy. w At this
time they could be promoted to all rates short of petty of-
ficer.
World War I .—From the time of the Civil War to
World War I there was considerable change in the policy of
allowing Negroes in the Navy. In World War I they consti-
tuted only 5,328 out of a total strength of 495*938. Vir-
tually all of this personnel was in the mess branch.
Between World Wars .—In 1920 the Navy stopped, of-
ficially, mixing crews. In 1922 they stopped recruiting
Negroes and filled the need for mess attendants from Fili-
pino personnel. As the Filipinos became more difficult to
recruit, in 1932 Negroes were recruited again for mess duties.
In July, 1939, Negroes constituted 2,807 out of 116,000 Navy
personnel. At this time there were no Negro commissioned or
warrant officers and practically all of the Negroes in the
Navy were in the mess branoh. In June, 1940, their number
was 4,007; June, 1941, 5,026.
Negroes in the Navy During World War II
Three stages of policy .—During World War II the Navy
2Ibid., p. 179.
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passed through three stages of policy toward Negro person-
nel:
1. Negroes were not wanted except as messmen.
2. Negroes were accepted for general service, but
a segregated system in training and assignment
was maintained as far as possible.
3. Segregation was abolished. This policy was on
paper and approved at the end of the war, and
it stands as postwar policy.
Early Policy .—On May 2, 1941, the policy of the Navy
as stated by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox was as follows:
To change the policy of the Navy and introduce Negroes
into categories other than the messmen 1 s branch would
provoke discord and demoralization and would lower the
efficiency of the service.
3
At this time Secretary Knox went on to say that the
problem was insoluble as the Navy couldn't have Northern
and Southern ships, the implication being that Southern
sailors would not tolerate Negro personnel aboard ship in
other than messmen ratings.
Also in 1941, Admiral Chester Nimltz stated:
After many years of experience, the policy of not en-
listing men of the Colored race for any branch of the
naval service except the Messmen 1 s branch was adopted
to meet the best interests of general ship efficiency.
4
Policy in 1942 .—On April 7, 1942, Secretary of the
-ill .... . - .
^Lawrence D. Reddick, "The Negro in the United
States Navy During World War II, n The Journal of Negro His-
tory
. April, 1947, P» 202.







Navy Frank Knox announced that the Navy was abandoning its
policy of enlisting Negro personnel only for mess duty. A
limited number of Negroes were to be enlisted for general
service.
This action, Knox said, was to be considered only
of an experimental nature. Negroes would be trained in
segregated areas at Great Lakes, 111., Hampton Institute,
Va., and Memphis, Tenn.
Class A service schools were established at Great
Lakes for the following rates: aviation metalsmith, gunner's
mate, signalman, radioman, cooks and bakers, and aviation
ordnanoeman. Teoman, storekeeper, and quartermaster schools
were established at Great Lakes also, but later moved to
Hampton Institute. In addition, Hampton had sohools for
motor machinist's mate, machinist's mate, electrician's
mate, shipfitter, and carpenter's mate. Memphis had a
school for aviation machinist's mate; Cape May, N. J.,
soundman; and Bainbridge, Md., athletic specialist.
Many educated Negroes felt that they were being
discriminated against in these schools and that they were
not being given the breaks that the white sailors got.
They believed that the whites liked the subservient type
of Negro better than the educated and ambitious. In order
to improve the standards of their race, members of the
educated group established literacy schools at Great Lakes
and elsewhere which they ran themselves.
<.
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In October, 1942, the Seabees opened their ranks to
Negroes. After December, 1942, there were virtually no more
volunteers coming into the Navy due to Selective Service.
In February, 1943, the Navy commenced to take Selective Ser-
vice Negroes on the basis of ten percent of the total strength,
as the Army was doing. In the fall of 1943 the transition
from the first stage of polioy to the second was complete.
In August of 1943 there were 64,964 Negroes in the Navy.
The first Negro ensign had been commissioned in June,
1942. In April, 1944, there were 22 Negro officers in the
Navy. The Navy V-12 program enrolled Negroes at Princeton
for the first time in that school^ history.
In 1944 the Navy commenced to accept Negro Waves,
and by the end of the war there were 2 officers and 57 en-
listed Waves. There were never more than 4 Negro nurses
out of a total of 10,914.
The third stage .—In July, 1944, the Secretary of
the Navy's Office announced that separate facilities and
quotas were impractical. In August of that year an indoc-
trination program was instituted and by June, 1945, there
were no separate camps.
The Navy published a pamphlet entitled Guide to
Command of Negro Naval Personnel in February, 1944. This
publication met with the approval of both Negro and white
personnel. A film entitled The Negro Sailor was also pro-




type of education was designed to smooth over interraoial
differences.
It was felt that an expert on racial relations should
be procured to make a report on conditions in the Navy, so
Lester B. Granger, of the National Urban League, was sent on
three tours for the purposes of observation and reporting.
He submitted a report on November 1, 1945, stating in part:
. . . .
morale and the performance of Negro servicemen
compared favorably with that of whites except in con-
ditions where rank discrimination existed or was be-
lieved to exist.
5
At the close of the war the official policy as stated
by Secretary of the Navy Forrestal was as follows:
In the administration of naval personnel, no differences
shall be made because of race or oolor. .... In their
attitude, and day to day conduot of affairs, naval of-
ficers and enlisted men shall adhere rigidly and impar-
tially to naval regulations in which no distinction is
made between individuals wearing naval uniform, or the
uniform of any of the armed services of the United States,
because of race or color .6
It can be seen that the official policy of the United
States Navy at the end of World War II was as unprejudiced as
possible with regard to Negro personnel.
Negroes had composed a total of 165,574 in the Navy
at their greatest strength. Of these 2,676 were casualties.
Two vessels, the Dl MASON and the PC 1264, were manned pre-
dominantly by Negro crews. The Navy's enlightened policy
has worked out far better than most of its critics had
5Ibld .. p. 215.
6lbld ., p. 217. The Navy Department Bulletin of 28




The Problem for the Future
There has been established a Civilian Advisory
Committee to the Secretary of the Navy which advises on
matters affecting Negro personnel. There are several prom-
inent Negroes on this committee, and complaints concerning
discrimination are handled through it.
Despite the official policy concerning Negro per-
sonnel, there is much difference of opinion as to the part
Negroes should play in the Navy. The messmen's branch is
still predominantly Negro. Prejudice is bound to exist in
the service just as it does in civilian life; a statement
of policy cannot change this. However, it is the duty of
those officers handling personnel to carry out Navy poli-
cies with the spirit and the letter of the policy in mind,
with the hope that this problem can be minimized as time
passes. At the same time, Negro personnel should be edu-
cated as much as possible in order for them to become capable
of assuming responsibility.
The Problem of Leadership
In the transition from manual labor to technical
work aboard ship, there has also been a subtle change in
the type of leadership required. In the sailing day3
battles were won by the shout of such phrases as "I have
-I M I M
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not yet begun to fight," or "DonH give up the ship." This
spirit can still be passed on to a certain percentage of the
crew in moments of action, but there is much preparation be-
fore a crew is ready for combat. It is in this time that
men learn to operate highly complicated machinery, and it
is in this period that battles are won or lost. The indi-
vidual must be led on to put forth his maximum efforts in
the training period if he is to function effectively in com-
bat.
This transition from the emotional type of leader-
ship to a scientific, psychological approach ha3 been ig-
nored by many naval officers. The individual attempting
to lead a man to greater efforts in the day to day oper-
ation of an electronic device, in figuring pay for the crew,
or in repairing a piece of complex machinery, must avail
himself of a sound psychological background in order to be
successful.
This does not necessarily imply a college degree in
psychology; many naval officers who have had no courses in
this subject have demonstrated their knowledge of the basic
needs in such leadership. These individuals will be able
to clarify their thinking with some Judicious reading, and
increase their effectiveness even more. For those who are
not possessed of a natural ability in leadership, some re-
search on the subject is a necessity if they are to get the
desired efforts from their personnel.
m u < ;
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The Social Status of Enlisted Men
The Sailor Stereotype
There Is a tendency to stereotype various types of
individuals as falling into certain set patterns. Thus the
average person has a preconceived notion as to what a doc-
tor should look like; a Judge probably calls to mind a men-
tal picture of a well-known moving picture character who
plays the role of a judge; to most civilians, the sailor
carries a stereotyped image also. The sailor's stereotype
is not flattering.
The picture whioh a sailor brings to mind is a hang-
over from the old days when seagoing men were very near the
lowest type of humanity. The men going to sea have improved
considerably but their reputation has not gone up accordingly.
What can be stated as reasons for this?
Reasons for the Stereotype
Actions of the sailors .—Public opinion is partially
justified in judging the sailor a free and easy character.
After a long period at sea even the most mild-mannered indi-
vidual is liable to let his hair down in the first bar. The
release of pent-up tension gained in long months at sea makes
him more inclined toward boisterous celebration than would
normally be the case. The resulting picture is completely in
accord with society's preconceived ideas; a drunken sailor, a
too* ftftt
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sailor fighting, a sailor pursuing a Scollay Square debu-
tante with reckless abandon*
A factor which is not obvious to the casual observer
is the probable model behavior of this same sailor aboard
ship. There his conduct might well serve as an example for
his civilian critics, but inasmuch as the civil population
oannot observe this phase of his life his virtues go un-
noticed. Public relations programs may publicize the sailor's
desirable features, but the individual's actions serve to be-
lie those words.
The uniform.—Another factor which tends to lower
the status of the sailor is his uniform. Varying so little
from apprentice seaman to first class petty offioer, it af-
fords small prestige to the petty officers. It carries out
the stereotype by being virtually the same uniform worn by
sailors a hundred years ago. The civilian observer cannot,
in most cases, read naval ratings and thinks that only the
chief petty officers are petty officers; the rest are "gobs w
in his eyes.
The Navy is doing research on the subject of a new
uniform, and it is hoped that there will be some progress
made in this field if only to distinguish petty officers
from non-rated men.
The sailors' associates .—A third reason for the low
status of sailors is the company they keep ashore. Navy per-





Navy personnel or with civilians met in casual association.
The latter are usually acquaintances from a not-too-accept-
able bar. This condition is due to the lack of contacts in
a strange town. The result is a quality of acquaintances
which is undesirable, and the man is Judged partially by
the character of his associates who are known to the town's
people
.
Pressure to conform ,—By the very fact that the
sailor is judged in this manner he feels the pressure to
conform to his prescribed role. The Individual may rebel
against the situation at first, but he finds it so diffi-
cult to break out of the stereotype and so easy to conform
that his solution is usually to become a ngood sailor" as
society likes to think of a sailor.
The Problem for the Navy
This lack of sailor status has the effect of keep-
ing out of the Navy the type of civilian necessary for the
efficient operation of today's complicated machinery. The
Navy is attempting to raise the status of its personnel,
but this is a long range problem and one whioh must be faced
honestly in order for any solution to be reached.
Public relations counselors point out that the most
effective instrument for building up public opinion is the
behavior and attitude of the members of an organization.
With this in mind, it is the responsibility of all naval
.:
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officers to take whatever steps are possible in order to
improve the level of personnel's behavior. This is an "all
hands" job which will take years to accomplish the desired
purpose, and should go along with constant efforts to im-
prove the intellectual and moral character of Navy enlisted
men.
Democracy in the Navy
Definition of Democracy
The government of the United States has its funda-
mental basis in the prinoiple of democracy; that is, "govern-
ment in which the supreme power is retained by the people."
Similarly, our social concepts have their basis in the broader
democratic prinoiple of "belief in or practice of social
equality; absence of snobbery. "7 As these precepts are basic
in the American way of life, it is a valid criticism of any
phase of our system to prove it is "undemocratic." However,
one must qualify this oritioism by noting that the definitions
given for democracy are the ideal; the ultimate which, while
perhaps not impossible of achievement, are not practiced in
their pure form by large organizations of any kind in the
United States.
7
' Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (fifth edition;








Criticisms Made of the Navy
In recent years there has been much criticism made
of the services, and the statement most commonly made is
that they are undemocratic. Considering the word in its
governmental sense, it is patently ridiculous that the ac-
tions of any military organization should be governed by a
majority vote of its members. In a broader sense, the
government of the military is actually a function of the
larger group of citizens, for it is they who elect the legis-
lators controlling the destinies of the services. In this
sense, then, the military is more democratic than most large
corporations, for it is under the direct control of the vot-
ing public.
It is in the social sense of democracy that the
critioism is most often made. It is often stated that the
services practice a "caste system* in which the enlisted men
are virtually "untouchables" and opportunity for advancement
is stopped at an almost impenetrable barrier between officers
and enlisted men. Discipline, say these critics, is undemo-
cratic and authoritarian in both a social and a governmental
sense.
All Organizations Operate Under Rules
In defense of the disciplinary system of the Navy,
it must be pointed out that the Navy is merely another large
t
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organization which can be compared with the large corporate
enterprises of the United States. All such organizations
must have a set of rules and regulations which effect a
smooth functioning and which have been built up over a long
period of operation as they were found necessary. The work-
man may be discharged if he violates such rules in a private
business; the student in a college expelled if he does not
conform to the school's edicts; the club member dropped if
he does not fulfill his obligations. It is not extraordinary
that the Navy has such a set of operating regulations; indeed,
it would be amazing if it did not. Similarly, once having
established the need for these regulations it must be con-
ceded that it is necessary to enforce them. Is it, then,
the means and methods of enforcing the regulations that are
undemocratic?
Methods of Enforcing Regulations
There is probably no other organization which has
built up suoh an elaborate system of appeals as the United
States Navy. These appeals protect the man involved to a
greater extent than do similar systems in industry, and the
officers passing on the man are inclined to be less preju-
diced than would be the supervisors in an Industrial concern,
due to the officers 1 greater security of position. The
punishment meted out is stated in formal declarations of
the Navy, and in many cases is less severe than would be
10 ' ••«
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the punishment for a similar offense in a civilian concern,
Charge of Social Inequality
A basic criticism, and one which has come in for a
great share of publicity in recent years, is the charge of
social inequality between officers and enlisted men. One
critic, speaking of the Army, says:
The Army is currently laying plans for a large peace-
time army. In spite of the attractiveness of a short-
term period of enlistment, choice of individual branch
of service, and handsome furlough policies, the men
are not re-enlisting in large numbers. Might their
reluctance to re-enlist be due to their disapproval
of the officer system? The Army would do well to pon-
der this question, 8
These critics go on to point out that while the
lowest employee of a civilian firm is theoretically able
to associate on equal terms socially with the company's
president, in the Navy the officer and enlisted man are
barred by policy from such fraternization.
The distinction is largely a technical one; the
instanoes in whioh the janitor and president of a concern
are seen lunching together are in such a minority as to be
regarded as social phenomena. The fact remains that the
janitor feels no social disbarment, nor does he see any
sharp dividing line between the people with whom he may
associate and those with whom he may not. The choice re-
%alph Lewis, nOfficer-Enlisted Men's Relation-
ship, tt American Journal of Sociology , March, 1947, p. 410.
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mains with him and the people whom he may meet.
The Navy's policies concerning social intercourse
between officers and enlisted men are of long standing, and
their basic principle is sound. Time and again the lesson
has been proven that "familiarity breeds contempt," and
young officers have learned that dignity lost is regained
with difficulty if at all. Living conditions aboard ship
are so much more intimate than in a civilian concern that
every effort must be made to preserve this dignity. This
situation is an example of a condition in which the status
quo has proven efficient in wartime for many years, while
experiments of other countries have shown that some alter-
natives are highly unsuccessful. The Navy will do well to
proceed with caution in any considered changes.
Alerting Men on Transfer
A problem which is administrative, but one which
concerns the peace of mind of enlisted men, is the current
practice of transferring men with little or no warning.
This occasions much hardship in many cases, for there is
not sufficient time to dispose of automobiles or other be-
longings, and wives are left behind to settle family affairs
The Navy should make efforts to transfer enlisted
men by name, and to give them adequate warning so that they
can effect their transfers with the minimum possible dislo-





1. The Navy, like other large organizations, has
personnel problems peculiar to the organization. In dis-
cussing these, it must be kept in mind that a partially
satisfactory status quo is often better than untried change,
2. There exists in the Navy at present a low moti-
vation toward advancement in rate on the part of many per-
sonnel. This is caused mainly by a feeling, partially jus-
tified, that there is not enough opportunity to advance.
3. The presence of Negroes in the Navy constitutes
a problem, just as does their presence in any other organi-
zation.
4. In World War II the Navy went through three
stages of policy toward Negroes: they were not wanted ex-
cept as messmen, they were accepted for general service but
segregated, and finally, segregation was abolished.
5. The Navy's policy toward Negroes at present is
as unprejudiced as that of any other organization. Much
good sociological work has been done by the Navy, and it
remains to be seen how effectively the new policy can be
carried out.
6. The type of desired leadership has changed from
emotional to scientific with the advent of complicated machin-
ery in the Navy. Many officers have not kept up with this
change
.
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7. Enlisted men are not given the social status
which their work and abilities warrant. They are stereo-
typed in an unflattering manner by the general population,
and this serves to keep desirable personnel out of the
Navy.
8. The Navy is criticized as being undemocratic
by some individuals. In most ways it is as democratic or
more so than other large organizations.
9. Certain Navy policies have been found necessary
due to the military situation; one of these concerns frater-
nization between officers and enlisted men. All aspects of
this situation should be considered carefully before any
change is attempted.
10. Alerting men a sufficient time before transfer
to allow them to settle their private affairs should be a
goal in personnel distribution work.
11. Naval leaders should maintain constant efforts
to raise the educational and moral standards of Navy person-
nel, for improvement must come from within. Any such im-
provement will benefit the naval service as well as the
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